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of biblical exegesis, namely, that the author of a biblical text wrote exactly 
what he meant, and nothing should be read into the text that is not there, 
whether other than law or law itself. Spinoza wields this principle not 
only against Maimonides for seeing physics and metaphysics in the Bible, 
but against the ancient rabbis as well for reading in legal content that is 
not there. Spinoza here means to attack the entire notion of a tradition of 
reading Scriptures that departs from the obvious meaning of the written 
word, a notion so vital to Judaism and Catholicism. He aims to replace 
tradition with “reason.”
After reading this volume, a Christian philosopher could well conclude 
that Jewish philosophical sources should be part of the standard curricula 
in the philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Focusing exclu-
sively on Christian philosophers, as some of us philosophers of religion 
do, excludes rich theistic philosophizing concerning the major issues in 
philosophy of religion of interest to Christian philosophers. The adding of 
Jewish resources into such courses would also accurately reflect the spirit 
of religious camaraderie and respect that a Jewish philosopher such as 
myself enjoys within the precincts of the Society of Christian Philosophers. 
Introducing Apologetics: Cultivating Christian Commitment, by James E. 
Taylor. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2006. ISBN 080102786. 
$34.99 (cloth).
PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, Duke Divinity School
To engage in apologetics is to do one of two things: to offer a reasoned, ver-
bal defense against a real or imagined attack; or to offer a reasoned, verbal 
attack upon a rival, real or imagined. We might call the former negative 
apologetics and the latter positive apologetics. What might be defended 
or attacked? In theory, almost anything (yourself, someone’s character, the 
United States of America, the appropriateness of genocide, the activity of 
smoking, the truth of Goldbach’s Conjecture), but most often some set of 
views or claims. Why might such defenses or attacks be offered? Again, 
the possibilities are endless, but usually negative apologetics is concerned 
to show why some argumentative attack upon some claim(s) fails, while 
positive apologetics is concerned to show the superiority of some claim(s) 
over some among (or even all) its possible rivals. The negative apologist 
adopts the beleaguered boxer’s defensive crouch, parrying the opponent’s 
blows; the positive apologist goes for the knockout. These two modalities 
of the apologetical enterprise are often inseparably mixed in the writing or 
speech of particular apologists; but it is useful to distinguish them none-
theless, because they have a different grammar, which means that criti-
cisms or recommendations that might reasonably be taken to apply to one 
mode won’t always (or usually) apply to the other.
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Christians have often engaged in apologetics, and sometimes also used 
that word, or its cognates in languages other than English, for what they 
do. Among the earliest Christian writings, for example, are Justin Mar-
tyr’s two apologies (mid-second century); in the mid-nineteenth century, 
John Henry Newman wrote his Apologia pro vita sua in defense not only 
of his own life and opinions, but also of the truth of the Catholic faith 
against its Protestant detractors (in that particular case, Charles Kingsley); 
and almost yesterday (2005), Avery Dulles, the recently-deceased Catholic 
theologian, wrote a substantial history of apologetics, in which, among 
other things, he argued that performing it is an essential element of the 
Christian response to the world. And there has been, since the sixteenth 
century, a flood of Catholic-Protestant apologetics from both sides, and 
(again from both sides, but more often from the Protestant one), of nega-
tive and positive apologetics directed toward anti-Christian arguments 
made by non-Christians, or toward views held by them that appear to the 
apologist incompatible with Christian views. The book under review here 
belongs to this last category.
This long apologetical history suggests that there’s something about 
Christianity that disposes its adherents to perform apologetically. And in-
deed there is: the Church has doctrines (this is not to say that all Christians 
know what they are), teachings, that is, about the nature and existence of 
God, about what God has done and is doing, about how God relates to all 
that is not God, about what human persons are like and are for, and about 
many ancillary and related matters. These teachings logically may, and 
often actually do, come under attack by those who hold rival and appar-
ently incompatible positions, and such attacks may prompt a negatively 
apologetical response. And among Christian doctrines there are those that 
suggest that it would be a good thing to persuade those who do not al-
ready assent to them to do so—or at least to adopt a mode of life that might 
dispose them to come to offer such assent. Thinking about such teachings 
has often led Christians to engage in positive apologetics, and thereby to 
show what is wrong with or lacking in positions held by those who are not 
Christians. In extreme cases, Christians have sometimes been led to think 
it necessary to offer a complete and systematic demonstration of the su-
periority of Christian views to all conceivable non- or anti-Christian ones.
But Christians have also argued among themselves about whether apol-
ogetics is effectively possible, whether it is necessary, whether some kinds 
are better than others, and the situations, if any, in which it should be per-
formed. These arguments have often centered around the theoretical and 
practical difficulties involved in arguing with the pagans. If the pagans 
are really, as some Christians have thought, cognitively as well as morally 
blind, what’s the point in offering them arguments? These disputes have 
often been closely linked with arguments about the possibility of engag-
ing in natural theology, which is to say (roughly) thinking about God’s 
existence, nature, and purposes without appealing to God’s explicit self-
revelation in the incarnation and in the ecclesial and scriptural witness to 
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it. There have also been disagreements about the appropriate audience for 
apologetical work (Christian? Pagan? Jewish?), about the possibility that 
engaging in it excessively elevates the importance of the cognitive over 
the affective and spiritual—and much more. Apologetics, therefore, while 
widespread in Christian time and place, has often also been controversial, 
in general and in particular cases.
James Taylor, on the evidence of the book under review here, knows all 
this very well. His is a book designed with an undergraduate audience in 
mind, bearing on its face all the marks of a book to be used by people who 
don’t read books as a matter of custom and pleasure. It comprises twenty-
five chapters, each with an introductory outline, a generous sprinkling 
of large-type sidebars, and a concluding set of questions for discussion 
and reflection together with recommendations for further reading. These 
devices have the effect of making this reader feel that the author thinks 
his readers idiots who need to be alternately shouted at and soothed. I 
wonder whether we wouldn’t do better by our undergraduates to treat 
them as adults who can read and think without these rebarbative devices? 
I understand that the author is unlikely to be responsible for book design, 
and that he, like all of us, is subject to forces beyond his control on these 
matters. But it is still worth castigating publishers for producing aesthetic 
horrors like this, and authors for letting them get away with it.
Nevertheless, there is a great deal of value in this book: it is written by 
someone who cares about both thinking and writing, and about the culti-
vation of “confident Christian conviction and commitment” (p. 12) among 
the Christian people.
In his first six chapters, Taylor treats the nature of apologetics, objec-
tions to it, and its various modalities and audiences. He advocates a re-
sponsibly fideist position, according to which faith is prior to reason in 
at least the double sense that one can properly come to have Christian 
conviction and to maintain that conviction without engaging in the wind-
mill-tilting exercise of assessing the truth of Christianity’s claims from a 
position that pretends not to assume that truth; and that one can reason-
ably have faith without knowing or being able to voice the reasons why 
the content of the faith is to be rationally preferred over its competitors. 
Taylor does not, however, think that the deployment of reasoned argu-
ment in apologetics, whether negative or positive, is unimportant for the 
Christian people. Engaging in apologetical argument can serve to explain 
the faith’s content to those who hold it; to help them to see the distinctive-
ness of Christian beliefs over against their rivals; to soothe anxieties about 
challenges to Christianity; and, perhaps, occasionally, to make the faith 
sufficiently attractive to those who do not hold it that they are converted, 
or at least moved toward the Church.
Especially valuable in these chapters is Taylor’s care with the ques-
tion of certainty and the relation of argument to its production and main-
tenance. He is rightly clear that holding certain claims de fide (he doesn’t 
put it that way) is not compatible with certain kinds of doubt about said 
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claims; and he is clear, as well, that assenting to a claim in this way does 
not insulate those who do so from thinking about said claim, or engag-
ing it argumentatively with its perceived competitors. Apologetics works 
in the space usefully cleared here between the irrelevance of argument to 
what’s held de fide and the epistemic dependence of what’s so held upon 
argument. Taylor’s own book moves in this space, and is addressed (al-
most exclusively) to Christians. This last fact is revealing, and I wish that 
he had said more about it. He does comment on it briefly in chapter six, 
but there remains something of a tension between his view that apolo-
getical argument may sometimes appropriately and productively be ad-
dressed to the pagan critic of Christianity, and the fact that his own book is 
addressed to the Christian faithful only, as instruction and comfort. 
Has there perhaps been a migration of apologetics inwards, away from 
engaging the pagans and toward cognitive therapy for Christians? There’s 
nothing necessarily wrong with that, if it’s so; but it would have been good 
to have some comment upon it.
Chapters seven through twelve treat what Taylor calls the families of 
worldviews. There are, he thinks, three such families: supernaturalist, 
naturalist, and pantheist. Christianity belongs to the perfect-being cre-
ation-monotheist subvariety of the first family, and is, he claims, rationally 
superior both to other kinds of monotheism, and to the varieties of pan-
theism which together constitute the supernaturalist family. There are, 
moreover, he thinks, good (but not rationally irresistible) cosmological 
and design arguments for the existence of the kind of God worshiped by 
Christians. And there are rational theodicies, which is to say argumenta-
tive responses to the problems posed for Christians by the existence of evil 
in the world, just as there are rational responses to the claim that God’s 
hiddenness from our eyes constitutes evidence against his existence.
It would be interesting to engage these positions seriatim; to do so is 
not possible within the scope of a review, but it is possible to identify 
and comment on what I take to be a series of closely associated and, as it 
seems to this reviewer, rather serious difficulties in the way that Taylor 
presents the arguments in these chapters. The first is that Taylor’s classi-
fication of worldviews is presented as if it were exhaustive—as if, that is, 
there were no way to think “about God and God’s relationship to the uni-
verse” (88) that cannot be accommodated into one of his three families. 
But this is not so, or at least arguably not so. Suppose, for example, God is 
not thought of as a being in the world whose existence, under a univocal 
understanding of existence, can be argued about. Suppose, rather, that 
God is understood as the one in whose existence that of all particular be-
ings participates, and who can be named only analogically. That view of 
God—‘the Lord’ would be better, since that is a proper name and ‘God’ 
a sortal—is, in my judgment, the properly Christian one, and it is not ac-
commodated by Taylor’s three worldview families because it denies the 
God-world distinction in the terms by means of which members of his 
three families argue about it.
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This classificatory problem is mirrored by, and involves, a difficulty 
about the understanding of God implied by Taylor’s depiction of the ar-
guments in these chapters. It is, to put a complex matter briefly, that God 
is understood as an idol, as a being who adds one to the count of beings 
in the world. This is to think of the Lord as if he were Zeus or Krishna. 
This difficulty can be seen with especial clarity in Taylor’s characteriza-
tion of “creation monotheism” in chapter eight, in his discussion of Behe’s 
anti-Darwinist arguments in chapter ten, and (most vividly) in his analy-
sis of the theodicy question in chapter eleven. An entailment of a fully 
Christian understanding of the Lord is that evil is privatio boni, an absence 
or lack rather than something to be accounted for. This has been the stan-
dard view of the Church for most of its history, and it is startlingly absent 
from Taylor’s discussion, and, hence, also from his provision of rebuttals 
to standard forms of the problem of evil. This is not to say that there is a 
logical problem with the rebuttals Taylor offers; it is, rather, that in offer-
ing them he seems to have in mind not the Lord’s relationship to the world 
and its lacks, but rather someone else’s.
I understand that the claims made in the last two paragraphs are not 
ones that all Christians would assent to, and that Taylor, whatever his posi-
tion on them, might have thought them best left aside in a book like this 
as technical questions about which Christians differ. But I think this is not 
so: they are fundamental to the grammar of Christianity, and to leave them 
aside is likely to give users of the book exactly the impression that the God 
about whose existence they are being trained to argue is one more being in 
the world, distinguished from others in degree only.
Chapters thirteen through nineteen treat the question of Jesus and the 
incarnation, with attention to the reliability of Scripture, Jesus’s miracles, 
his resurrection, whether salvation is dependent upon confessing Jesus as 
Lord (together with the associated difficulties raised by the existence of 
long-lived religious traditions other than Christianity). There is much of 
value here: Taylor has read widely, and thought hard about the complex 
range of issues he treats in this section. He is properly modest both about 
what the content of Christian orthodoxy is on some of these matters (for 
example, on the question of the salvation of the unbaptized), and about 
the degree of firmness with which claims about the relations between the 
various documents that make up the New Testament should be held and 
argued for. But there are some difficulties in these chapters, too, among 
which I note the one that seems to me especially pressing.
This has to do with Taylor’s treatment of the reliability of the texts of 
the New Testament as witnesses to and descriptions of (for example) what 
Jesus of Nazareth said and did. It is not that there are problems with the 
particulars of the arguments; it is rather that there are difficulties with 
the assumptions that underlie the arguments. Taylor thinks he needs to 
argue against those who regard (for instance) the Gospels as fictions, or 
as a complex mix of fact and fiction. But in so doing he accepts the critics’ 
terms, and is as a result largely blind to all the interesting, and properly 
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Christian, and scripturally serious, questions about Scripture’s component 
texts. How, for instance, do the four Gospels, individually and collectively, 
present themselves? What signals internal to the text are there about the 
genre(s) to which they belong and the response they seek—no, demand—
from readers? Do the questions that animate the Jesus Seminar and Taylor’s 
rebuttal to it animate them? These questions are not simple, but they are 
the kinds of question to which a scripturally-serious reader should be 
drawn, and to which the gaze of a scripturally-serious Christian under-
graduate should be turned. Arguments about the extent to which the Gos-
pels serve as windows upon an extra-textual reality that could be filmed 
or watched are, mostly, beside the point, and their prominence in these 
chapters is evidence of the extent to which much Christian apologetics has 
permitted its agenda to be set for it by pagan concerns. Such arguments, 
to put the matter pointedly, almost always—and often here—deploy an 
understanding of ‘historical event’ arrived at by attending to what the pa-
gans ask for, not to what Scripture and tradition say.
One way to put the disagreement I’ve just been expressing is to say 
that it is about hermeneutics, about what it means to read a text. Taylor 
is sometimes explicit about his own views on these matters, as when he 
claims that reading Scripture requires—and is perhaps exhaustively ac-
countable in terms of—answering the question of what the human author 
of a scriptural text intended to convey in writing it (p. 311, inter alia). I 
think this a quite spectacularly false claim about the reading of texts in 
general and of scriptural texts in particular: the discernment of human 
authorial intention is neither necessary nor sufficient for construing any 
text. But my worry, in a book like this, is not principally about the truth or 
falsity of this claim, or about the defensibility or indefensibility of the her-
meneutical stance it participates in, but rather about the author’s insou-
ciance in assuming its obviousness. There is certainly nothing Christian 
about such a claim; indeed, the witness of the Church is very substantially 
against it. In inducting students into the discipline of thinking about the 
content of the faith, isn’t it important to signal clearly to them what be-
longs to the faith and what does not, what is contested and what is not, 
what is obvious and what is not?
The last section of Taylor’s book, chapters twenty through twenty-
five, responds to contemporary challenges to Christian claims, challenges 
from the social and natural sciences, and from some currents of thought 
in recent philosophy—postmodernism and various kinds of materialism, 
principally. Here Taylor is on stronger ground, showing with clarity and 
care the difference between, for example, Darwinism as an explanation 
of particular facts about the world and Darwinism as an explanation of 
everything informed by dogmatic naturalism. I have more sympathy than 
he does with some varieties of what he calls postmodernism, most espe-
cially in its critique of various forms of foundationalism and its affirma-
tion of the inexhaustibility of texts. But this is a difference of emphasis 
only, I think.
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As a whole, then, Taylor’s work is an instance of a long-lived Chris-
tian activity. He instructs Christians in negative and positive apologet-
ics, which is to say in how they might best think about and respond to 
critiques of Christianity, as well as argue for the rational superiority of 
Christianity over its rivals. His book is not meant to be read by the pagans, 
and it does not show deep engagement with particular pagan texts. In this 
it differs from many premodern Christian apologias (think of Origen on 
Celsus or Augustine on Faustus). Taylor wants to instruct neophytes in the 
faith’s grammar as a means of helping them deepen their understanding 
of their faith. This is a noble and properly Christian goal, and while I have 
many disagreements, some of them fundamental, with the way in which 
Taylor carries it out, those disagreements should not be taken to impugn 
the value of the project.
The Works of Bishop Butler, edited by David E. White. University of Rochester 
Press, 2006. Pp. vii + 433. $95 (hardback).
CHRISTOPHER D. JONES, Boston College
Bishop Joseph Butler (1692–1752), author of the Fifteen Sermons and The 
Analogy of Religion, is an important figure in early modern moral philosophy 
and philosophy of religion. His completed works have long been out of 
print, however, with J. H. Bernard’s 1900 edition being the most recent 
publication. Time is ripe for a new edition and David E. White’s The Works 
of Bishop Butler ably fits the bill. Including all of Butler’s surviving writ-
ings, an introduction, notes reflecting recent Butler scholarship, and an 
up-to-date bibliography, Works is a valuable addition to the library of phi-
losophers of religion, moral philosophers, and historians of early modern 
philosophy.
Works opens with White’s Introduction, which is an admirable ground-
ing of philosophy in its history. Butler is presented as a brilliant moralist, 
an incisive apologist, and a caring pastor whose Christian beliefs and pas-
toral office shaped both his general methodology and his philosophical 
positions. It is common knowledge that Butler was a Christian philoso-
pher, but few today attend to the ways in which the demands of Butler’s 
office as a parish priest and bishop shaped his philosophical views. White 
wants to change this, and insists on reading Butler as a philosopher whose 
work has practical, even pastoral aims. He reminds us that
None of Butler’s works were written for academic reasons; they were written 
either to discharge his duties as a priest in the Church of England or in an 
attempt to advance his career. Their aim is neither to inform nor to persuade 
but to convert, to convert from the dissolute life, that so often leads to ruin, 
to the life of virtue and piety, that . . . will bring us the greatest goodness and 
happiness that is possible for humans. (p. 4)
